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AbstractCan individual self‐control problems affect policy variables? And if so, through what type of channels? Building on recent literature in political economy, we explore a specific channel that allows for links between individual addiction and state taxes. We develop a theoretical lobbying model to explain the role of addiction in the political process of cigarette taxation. Our model shows that equilibrium cigarette taxes are determined by the average addiction level in society, corruption, and their interaction. Our results suggest a potential impact of individual self‐control issues in the process of government policy.

How much should we pay to remove the interdependence of biased information sources? This question is relevant in both statistics and political economy. When there are many information sources or variables, their dependence may be unknown, which creates multivariate ambiguity. One approach to answer our leading question involves use of decoupling inequalities from probability theory. We present a new inequality, designed to cope with this question, which holds for any type of dependence across information sources. We apply our method to a simple formalization of a political echo chamber. For a given set of marginal information, this bound is the sup over all possible joint distributions connecting the marginals. Our method highlights a price to pay for facing summed dependent (multivariate) data, similar to the probability premium required for univariate data. We show that a conservative decisionmaker will pay approximately 50% more than if the data were independent, in order to freely neglect the correlations.